Have you ever just started thinking about life and stuff enough to be the next Socrates, Oscar Fucking Awesome Wilde, or Emerson? If yes then do tell.
What's interesting is neurophilosophy is starting to conclude many similar things as Jean Baudrillard. A quote from my essay:Julianking93 said:I do think about things a bit like Baudrillard with the whole "Our life is a mere simulation" or things like "We are only the product of our own or someone else's imagination."
The idea of a 'world model' (our limited perceptual representations that construct this world) or simulation with an embedded phenomenal self model (in Baudrillard's simulacrum) has been explored by both post-modernists and now neurophilosophers. Metzinger main thesis is that the self is an inner representation within a system?s brain allowing the possibility of a first-person perspective. It is an internal representation of the system itself, our ?simulacra? in the word of Baudrillard, an illusion that constitutes our Self. Besides allowing a first-person perspective, our ?simulacrum? also possesses many useful functions, such as providing a sense of ownership, selfhood, and perspectileness. Metzinger posits a neuromatrix (i.g., a set of causal relations or neural correlates within the brain) constantly sustains the self. However, it is provisional (i.g., it resembles a chain of Now?s). Instead of a linear progression or decay, the self resembles a chain of Now?s. To quote the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, this indicates the self is "empty of inherent existence" since it is in a constant flux.Postmodern philosophy has made similar assertions to Metzinger for years. Jean Baudrillard's magnum opus, Simulacra and Simulation¸ posits that reality (the Real) has been replaced by symbols that no longer represent any external reality, if they ever did. Reality and concept are viewed symbolically, as structures that are drawn out of an unsymbolizable Real. In this way, the Self is viewed as a structure, an image drawn from reality, composed of symbols. Jean Baudrillard famously remarked "I am my own simulacrum". The "simulacra" that Jean Baudrillard outlines is directly identical to the PSM that Metzinger outlines in The Ego Tunnel. Metzinger's outline of the inner systems of the brain, the image of perspective that we generate of our reality, the internal representation of the system itself, is our simulacra, an illusion that constitutes our Self.
So here's the important question (Well, no, the important question is: Will it get a publishing deal?, but still)InconceivableTruth said:What's interesting is neurophilosophy is starting to conclude many similar things as Jean Baudrillard. A quote from my essay:Julianking93 said:I do think about things a bit like Baudrillard with the whole "Our life is a mere simulation" or things like "We are only the product of our own or someone else's imagination."
The idea of a 'world model' (our limited perceptual representations that construct this world) or simulation with an embedded phenomenal self model (in Baudrillard's simulacrum) has been explored by both post-modernists and now neurophilosophers. Metzinger main thesis is that the self is an inner representation within a system?s brain allowing the possibility of a first-person perspective. It is an internal representation of the system itself, our ?simulacra? in the word of Baudrillard, an illusion that constitutes our Self. Besides allowing a first-person perspective, our ?simulacrum? also possesses many useful functions, such as providing a sense of ownership, selfhood, and perspectileness. Metzinger posits a neuromatrix (i.g., a set of causal relations or neural correlates within the brain) constantly sustains the self. However, it is provisional (i.g., it resembles a chain of Now?s). Instead of a linear progression or decay, the self resembles a chain of Now?s. To quote the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, this indicates the self is "empty of inherent existence" since it is in a constant flux.Postmodern philosophy has made similar assertions to Metzinger for years. Jean Baudrillard's magnum opus, Simulacra and Simulation¸ posits that reality (the Real) has been replaced by symbols that no longer represent any external reality, if they ever did. Reality and concept are viewed symbolically, as structures that are drawn out of an unsymbolizable Real. In this way, the Self is viewed as a structure, an image drawn from reality, composed of symbols. Jean Baudrillard famously remarked "I am my own simulacrum". The "simulacra" that Jean Baudrillard outlines is directly identical to the PSM that Metzinger outlines in The Ego Tunnel. Metzinger's outline of the inner systems of the brain, the image of perspective that we generate of our reality, the internal representation of the system itself, is our simulacra, an illusion that constitutes our Self.
If you're interested, you may read my essay here:
http://phoenixicsepehr.blogspot.com/2010/04/phenomenal-model-and-simulacra-self.html
Irrelevant, personal gain on the part of the censoree, the people who have power.lilmisspotatoes said:I tend to ponder the socio-philosophical conundrums brought up by Metal Gear Solid 2 quite often. Are we all the product of someone else's work? Is there really a reason to censor reality and the flow of information that comes from the world? Who has the right to decide what we see and hear?
This one?milskidasith said:EDIT: This brings to mind a certain SMBC strip, but I can't remember what the date was. Engineers and philosophy (I'm not an engineer, but I am planning on majoring in chemical engineering, so yeah).
That exact one.Swarley said:This one?milskidasith said:EDIT: This brings to mind a certain SMBC strip, but I can't remember what the date was. Engineers and philosophy (I'm not an engineer, but I am planning on majoring in chemical engineering, so yeah).
http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=1879#comic
Actually, Metzinger uses empirical data to back up his assertion. The only main background assertion he makes is there is a neuromatrix sustaining our virtual model of self. He also explains how this self model and our sense of it is experiential.milskidasith said:So here's the important question (Well, no, the important question is: Will it get a publishing deal?, but still)
What practical meaning does this accomplish? If I'm catching your meaning right, it's basically saying that we don't perfectly see ourself mentally, just an illusion of our thoughts our brain creates so we can have thoughts, and that that illusion only exists, not based on all experiences, but only on the exact situation we are in.
So... we all can't really know what we think, just what we think we think, and it's only based on what is happening right now, not based on past experiences and foresight (even though foresight is what separates us from other animals, among other things). How is this relevant to anything pertaining in the real world, and where is the scientific study backing it up?
Final Fantasy 1 was a last-ditch effort by Square Enix to avoid failure as a company. They weren't expecting it to sell very well at all, they were expecting it to be their final game. Then it became a hit, and they had more than enough money to make another game. They decided to make their next game Final Fantasy II so that fans of the original would immediately see it in stores and pick it up. They kept doing that and that's where we are today.Douk said:If its called Final Fantasy... why are there so many?
How does that prove anything practical? You've completely evaded the question there. Even if it proves his concept of oneness, it doesn't prove *anything* practical.Actually, Metzinger uses empirical data to back up his assertion. The only main background assertion he makes is there is a neuromatrix sustaining our virtual model of self. He also explains how this self model and our sense of it is experiential.
For example, take the rubber hand experiment. Let's say I put one of your hands in a dark spot on a table and your other on your back. If I were to place a rubber hand in the light and rub both synchronously, then you will eventually mistaken the rubber hand as your own. This is an actual replicable study, and Metzinger claims this is the phenomenal target property 'mineness' of the PSM manifesting itself.
And it still addresses no practical concerns. It may be more empirical than I expected, but that only knocks down one of four major issues I have.Neurophilosophy is different from philosophy of mind because it assumes a physicalist, empirical model of the universe. It seeks to address philosophical issues from a neuroscientific and empirical vantage point.
Actually, in terms of physics, there's a concept that no matter what the paradigm shift is, it will *always* include all the observations from the previous paradigm; from Newtonian physics to Relativity, for example, still had the math from Newtonian physics work out. No scientist is prepared for a massive paradigm shift where everything we've observed is proven wrong, because it is *incredibly* unlikely that hundreds of years of experiments could be proven wrong while at the same time all the results we have obtained being verifiable with the new theory.You may claim this theory is more theoretical, and I would agree. However, much of science and our models of reality are theoretical. A real scientist and philosopher is always prepared for a paradigm shifts...
This is *exactly* why I have zero confidence in philosophy; by assuming there will be lots of paradigm shifts, you are actually positing that the current research will be outdated. Plus, no other science can guarantee lots of paradigm shifts will occur, and it seems as if philosophy draws conclusions and then gets evidence, rather than the other way around (for instance, the rubber hand experiment seemed to have been formulated to prove his concept of self, and not the other way around, but I could have the wrong impression).You prepare yourself too because we're gonna have A LOT of paradigm shifts in the future.
His philosophy is applicable in a scientific and psychological context. I don't understand your criticism. Why does it need a "practical usage". It has a psychological one. We could use his model as a way to manipulate someone's sense of self. Recently, scientists have manipulated a fly's memory and added false memories. Could this conceivably be done to a person's sense of self? Disrupt the neural correlates that sustain the self and create a 'philosophical zombie'? That's pretty big stuff. As you can see, his philosophy does make some bold claims and has huge applicability.ultrachicken said:How does that prove anything practical? You've completely evaded the question there. Even if it proves his concept of oneness, it doesn't prove *anything* practical.
If you want "practical" philosophy, then read ethics.And it still addresses no practical concerns. It may be more empirical than I expected, but that only knocks down one of four major issues I have.
We've gone from a geocentric model of the universe to a heliocentric one... There are instances in which a paradigm shift results in the preceding paradigm being falsified. Simple observation indicates this.Actually, in terms of physics, there's a concept that no matter what the paradigm shift is, it will *always* include all the observations from the previous paradigm; from Newtonian physics to Relativity, for example, still had the math from Newtonian physics work out. No scientist is prepared for a massive paradigm shift where everything we've observed is proven wrong, because it is *incredibly* unlikely that hundreds of years of experiments could be proven wrong while at the same time all the results we have obtained being verifiable with the new theory.
Philosophy has no such concept, as far as I know.
I was referring to science, my friend. There are a lot of presuppositions in science, and I find this new wave of this presupposed mechanistic, phsyicalist model of reality to be odd *cough Richard Dawkin, Peter Atkins, and etc. fans cough*. Philosophy of science addresses the foundations of empirical science and basically form much of the backbone to it. Afterall... isn't the scientific method philosophy?This is *exactly* why I have zero confidence in philosophy; by assuming there will be lots of paradigm shifts, you are actually positing that the current research will be outdated. Plus, no other science can guarantee lots of paradigm shifts will occur, and it seems as if philosophy draws conclusions and then gets evidence, rather than the other way around (for instance, the rubber hand experiment seemed to have been formulated to prove his concept of self, and not the other way around, but I could have the wrong impression).
If this is referring to me, then you have misinterpreted my posts. I never said philosophers are scientists or the opposite. I do not believe metaphysics or any branch of philosophy form as science. I, however, see the value in philosophy and how it addresses much of our presuppositions.Horben said:Not since I realized that real philosophers renamed themselves "scientists".