Chefodeath said:
Always good to answer good questions.
1: When I say essence, I mean that which cannot be taken from a thing without fundamentally changing what that thing is. I would have used Aristotle's substance, but I thought it would lead to confusion as colors are classically seen as accidentals and non-substantive in the Aristotelian canon. It should also be noted that I'm not talking about any actual objective physical phenomena of light or somesuch, but just the subjective qualitative phenomena of red.
In your getting beaten up example, you ask that this has to be pain. I'd say its not, which is entirely my point. My brain has all these complex ideas attached to my vision of pain, it tells me that I would not enjoy it at all, it tells me what parts of my body would be sore, but it DOES NOT replicate my feeling actual pain, which is the essence of pain, the feeling of it. A good thing it doesn't or I would be screaing in agony every time my mind wandered to a painful experience. Regardless, the essence of pain is absent from the thought, so it cannot properly said to be "about pain"
2: I am saying that the abstract thought of red does not contain the essence of red yes. I believe I have a marker in my head that says "when presented with the stimuli of red, then this, this, and this." But I do not think, as is common thought, that we are able to access red at will. Therefore, I don't think that placemarker can really be called a "thought of red"
3: I don't see what you're trying to say with the last. If you could please rephrase.
Thank you for taking your time to respond! It's a very interesting idea indeed, worthy of proper discussion.
First of all, my example of the "essence of pain" was just to see if I had grasped your idea, I was trying to put your theory into another context to see if I fully understood it. I think I got a better understanding of what you were saying thanks to your response. Actually, most of my post was about clarifying, as Im sure you can/could tell. They werent rethorical questions, (well, not all of them) but actual questions.
Now, I still find some things that make me hesitate to agree with you.. Mainly questions of definition, which always, in the words of the ancients, is a *****.
First of all, if I may continue with the Pain Problem, I see your reasoning and it isnt illogical at all, quite the opposite. But still, I would disagree with you on the definition of essence as an experience:
You seem to (or so it seems to me) have a view on existence that is largely based on empiricism, or maybe rather your interaction with things and what that produces. So, would you mind clarifying your view on this? I mean, in the sense of "The noise of the lone tree"-example? (If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it etc.) Because it seems to me that your philosophy on this particular aspect of existence is based on interaction: If I can see it, it exists. If I can touch it, it is there, if I experience it, I know the essence, etc.
The reason I drew this conclusion (although possibly only temporary, depending on what you think and if you disagree or not) was because you defined the essence of an object, as we said, as the EXPERIENCE of that object. It is not pain, but you FEELING pain. It is not red, but you SEEING red. Am I making myself understood at all? Your thought of visualizing red is not, atleast what I think, thinking about red. It is simply visualizing red, thinking of SEEING red. However, you can still think of red, and KNOW what red looks like, right? Of course, red is harder to define than pain, so in this particular question it is rather the "knowledge of red" that is the definition, if you understand what Im saying. This is still just another word for definition, though.
But still, I think we need to make a distinction between the two of these: I think the essence of pain would rather be the definition: Something that hurts, that causes unpleasant thoughts, physical "non-wellbeing", and so on. The IDEA, the DEFINITION of pain, so to speak. This, we can think of, because it is made up of language. This is important, because we can not feel pain without a definition of pain. We wouldn't be able to call it pain, would we?
This definition refers to pain as a phenomenom in itself. Naturally, the need to define it came from something, which was the experience of pain. But as soon as we define pain, the idea of pain can exist without the experience of pain. I suppose you could say we derive our definitions from experience, but the these do not define the experience.
Now, the EXPERIENCE of pain, that's where I agree with you. We can not think of this, but rather think of the definition of pain, or a particular moment of pain, or the feeling pain brings us, but we can not re-enact the experience of pain.
I have another question, which is sort of what I meant with "#3". (The one you asked me to rephrase - and for good reasons too!) Im basically asking you to clarify you view with this example: If the essence of pain is the experience, and the experience is the active interaction with the object, (feeling pain) and we can not think of the experience; what makes us fear pain? I'll try to make myself clearer:
Imagine seeing a hot stove. Someone asks you to put your hand on the stove. You don't do it, right? Why? Probably because you can imagine the pain that the hot stove would bring to you: you know it will be unpleasant. You say "This will bring me the experience of pain", which, from what Ive understood, you mean is the essence of pain. But experiencing pain seems strange to consider an essence, since it's made up of two words. So, let's split it in half, and look at the latter: What are you experiencing? Pain, right? But to explain what youre experiencing, you must be able to define pain. And to define pain, you must think of pain and what it means. That is, however unclearly it is explained here, what I think seems more reasonable at the moment.
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...The moment, by the way, is 1:24 AM. If there are problems with my post, I'll blame them on me being tired (as much as you'll allow).