I have only provided one definition of critical theory.
Is that the one you've just provided, the one from the Wikipedia article or the one from the Standford Encylopedia? Which of those definitions is the one you are using?
If they weren't doing the same thing, why would you list them all together like that?
I've already provided you that answer.
I list them all together because they are people you might teach in a critical theory class. They are all
theorists whose work is based in
critique. They all draw on that intellectual legacy of
critical philosophy and German idealism. They aren't doing the same thing, they don't even remotely agree with each other, often they are intellectual rivals or represent competing schools of thought that are completely irreconcilable, but the method they use to arrive at the conclusions they do is nonetheless similar, so for the purposes of pedagogy we group them together.
Attacking power structures is great in an instance of human corruption, but does absolutely no good at all at dealing with an invasive beetle killing all the trees.
I mean, sure, the beetles themselves aren't really part of a human power structure, (even there some people might disagree, but let's ignore that for now) but everyone else involved in this situation is. What are the various interests involved with this beetle problem? Is it a purely environmental problem? Are there economic interests bound up in it? Have people suffered financial losses? If so, have they been offered compensation and what interests informed that decision? What are the possible solutions, and who is responsible for making the decisions? How is that decision making process being made. Is the decision making process appropriate, does it accurately reflect the range of interests involved?
I could go on, but you see what I'm saying right. For something to be a problem needing a solution, it kind of has to be a problem that affects people, and if it affects people, then societal power structures are still relevant.
The natural state of the world does not give you houses, clothes, agriculture... society, including the power structures of society, helps with far more important issues than what it creates, so to approach any given situation with the assumption that power structures are problematic is essentially suicidal.
Would you have said that to Jewish people during the holocaust?
And before you dismiss this as a silly example, remember that the Frankfurt school were mostly Jewish, and that they lived through the holocaust. Their criticisms of the society they lived in are generally not abstract, many of them would spend their lives trying to understand the mechanism by which a democratic society became a totalitarian society dedicated to murdering people like them. That's certainly the most common context in which I've encountered the work of members of the Frankfurt school.
Regardless, this isn't an argument about critical theory. It's an argument that goes back to the very origins of liberalism and absolutism, and in particular to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes also lived through a shitty event, the English civil war, and what he took away from his life experience is that human beings are awful and cannot exist without destroying each other unless there is a strong, authoritarian society to keep them in line. For Hobbes, being part of a society means you've already opted out of the right to make any demands. Even if the king or the government is bad, you should just accept it because doing anything to change your situation is morally wrong. That said, even Hobbes also understood that morality and politics were not the same thing, that a king abusing their power was also morally wrong.
But do you think Hobbes was right? Does a person have a moral responsibility to simply accept the hierarchy they live in? Is trying to change an authoritarian system that is harmful to you the same thing as not wanting to live in a society at all?
Obviously not, it's a comical position which made sense 400 years ago, and even then wasn't as weird as you're trying to make it now. Even Hobbes understood the right to criticize power, he just didn't that that criticism should ever be allowed to have political consequences. Personally, I'm not really cool with the idea of being ruled by an absolute monarch, so I'm okay with the idea of political criticism of existing power structures. Maybe I'm just weird like that.
Foucault is retrospectively assigned the label of critical theorist by people who are concerned with rationalizing how power structures are problematic, because the work of a philosopher/political activist who saw power structures in all things contains a lot of arguments useful for building that rationalization.
Is the definition of critical theory that you're using not something that has been retrospectively assigned? Again, you're not using Horkheimer's definition any more, so what are you using? Are you using the same definition of critical theory that self-described critical theorists use?
Foucault didn't describe himself as a "critical theorist", but like Horkheimer he did provide us with a very comprehensive definition of what it means to be "critical". His work is absolutely critical, it's just that being critical doesn't actually mean what you seem to think it means. But again, the elephant in the room here is that you're not being honest about what your definition of critical theory actually is.
In academia, we don't generally categorize things in terms of their adherence to fixed "doctrines" or ideological cults. We categorize them in terms of their influences, their role in human knowledge and in terms of what we think is the best way to teach them.
I think an old bridge in disrepair is a problem. Horkheimer would suggest the powers that be of society that allowed it to fall into disrepair, along with all the historical context that allows those powers to be, are the actual problem.
Why are those two interpretations mutually exclusive?
For all that you're trying to define critical theory as necessarily extreme and dogmatic, but it seems like your position is the one that is dogmatic. In particular, it seems to be dogmatically opposed to certain modes of thought even if those modes of thought turn out to be true or useful. It should be extremely obvious to everyone that the a bridge has a relationship to the people who build and use it, and if the bridge has been neglected, then the reasons are likely human, but you, for some reason, seem to find it morally and emotionally upsetting that we would even think about the bridge in terms of its relationship to a society, and should instead blindly and unquestioningly confine ourselves to focusing on the technical details of how to repair it. It's a position of wilful and deliberate blindness and thoughtlessness.
Also, in a very revealing twist on this metaphor, you've already decided that the bridge being in disrepair is a problem, but maybe it isn't a problem. Maybe the bridge being in disrepair isn't actually a problem at all. Maybe the society that built it no longer needs it. Maybe it's so old that repairing it has simply become too costly. Maybe the bridge has a deeper significance and people want to leave it as it is rather than try and return it to use. We can't know these things without knowing the relationship between the bridge and the people.
Again, you need to go away and examine your own conspiratorial thinking, and I think you need to genuinely ask yourself why you are so obsessed with this group of people who you know almost nothing about and who have very little relationship to each other. Why have you created this bizarre and self-consciously evil ideology, and then assigned it to a group of people whose "crime", in reality, is thinking about things on a different level to you. What exactly is your stake and your problem here?