flarty said:
DrOswald said:
Are you saying the impending invasion of the soviets had nothing to do with their surrender then? It was at least a reinforcing factor to decide to surrender after the bombs. The US had long broken Japanese codes and knew that surrender was on the table despite the arguing happening in house. If America wasn't interested in an unconditional surrender then there was absolutely no need to use the bomb. I think the US was more interested in the effects of using the bomb on a population, and sending a strong political message to the Russians. Japan had already lost the war, and with them surrounded, it was just a matter of waiting for surrender.
1. I never said that the Soviets had nothing to do with the surrender. The combined shock of the bombings and the Soviet invasion had a profound impact and lead to Japanese surrender.
2. Just because the Allies were not pushing for unconditional surrender does not mean they would accept any conditions. As I have said in two separate posts now which you have responded to, the problem was that the Japanese were unwilling to surrender under the terms of the Potsdam declaration, and the Allies (and the United States in particular) were unwilling to accept anything less.
3. It is true that the Allies had broken the Japanese code and were intercepting many of their communications. So, what did the communications intercepted say?
Intercepted July 22nd: "Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much more bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will."
Commentary written July 24th concerning an intercepted message In which Sato (the Japanese ambassador) outlines the position of Japan as he sees it:
"Sato sent a long message outlining what he conceived to be Japan's position, which was in brief that she was now entirely alone and friendless and could look for succor from no one."
And another quote from the same commentary:
"He finally concluded by implying that he realized what he was saying might not be welcomed by the Government at home but that his conscience still forced him to send the message. The response to his message was that the cabinet in council had weighed all the considerations which he had raised and that their final judgement and decision was that the war must be fought on with all the vigor and bitterness of which the nation was capable."
Intercepted July 29th, In response to Sato urging Tokyo to send concrete terms of surrender and to respond to the Potsdam Declaration: "As a counter-measure in response to the Joint Declaration, we are adopting a policy of careful study."
At the same time, Prime Minister Suzuki responded to questions about the Potsdam declaration with the following statement: "We can only ignore it. We will do our utmost to complete the war to the bitter end."
Intercepted July 30th: "it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once."
Intercepted August 3rd, in a report on Japanese intelligence on the preparations of America for the invasion of Japan: "American preparations for a landing on Japan will not be completed as soon as American military authorities secretly gave great Britain and Russia to understand they would be."
From the same intercept: "British military authorities warned them (the Americans) that military preparations were not yet sufficient to take the decisive step of a landing."
And more: "The present American offensive is manifestly based on political and diplomatic considerations."
Intercepted August 4th: A report on Japanese preparations to repel an American invasion.
There are many more intercepted messages, but they all contain similar content to the above.
From these intercepts the Americans knew that the Japanese were unwilling to surrender under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. In the mean time, the Japanese were strengthening their defenses and preparing to repel the promised invasion. Every day the allies waited to strike the Japanese defenses were improved and the cost of forcing a surrender would be greater.
An ultimatum had been declared and rejected. The Japanese were unwilling to accept the terms of surrender given, the Allies (especially the Americans) were unwilling to accept any other terms, and time was a vital factor in reducing the cost in human lives to force the terms of surrender.
Thus the need for swift and decisive action. Traditional bombings and even fire bombings were not enough to shock the Japanese into submission. An invasion would not be possible until November, 2 months later and was an unattractive option due to the ever strengthening Japanese defenses. The bomb was the quickest, most effective option available.