Treblaine said:
If they thought that the Japanese were a defeated force in mid 1945, then why were the Allies rushing troops from Europe to Japan shortly after V-E Day?
They weren't rushing troops from Europe to Japan after VE day. There were very few units which were deployed to both theatres of war, the largest probably being the 87th Infantry Regiment who fought in the Aleutian Islands and Europe. All of units who were to recieve orders of battle for Operation Olympic were already deployed to the Pacific.
Treblaine said:
Look, the Allies did not know how well the Japanese Armed Forces were faring up, it was entirely Retroactive the declarations that they would have surrendered with merely continued blockade after they were occupying the country. The intelligence the Allies collected on Japan was from 20'000 feet with cameras, not on the ground. It was the combination of Air-dropped sea-mines and the U-Boat campaign. But this was no "humane" act, unrestricted warfare on all shipping including civilians, explosive mine that persist decades after the war, starving an entire nation would lead to hundreds of thousands of people dying. The study of the effect of radiation on the population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been greatly disrupted by how malnutrition was affecting the population in such extremes.
The blockade was hardly passive, keep in mind a virtually unopposed air campaign was ongoing. Intelligence was collected from a variety of sources besides aerial photography. Many Japanese officials who sought peace were covertly in contact with the Allies. Allied cryptanalysis projects were well established and highly successful at this point in war.
The argument that the blockade was not "humane" is rather moot given that the alternative chosen was to vapourize two cities and subject large numbers of the population to the effects of nuclear radiation for decades after the war..
Treblaine said:
Japan had its own agriculture. For hundreds of years the country was extremely isolationist with virtually no overseas trade. Japan had the internal capacity to feed its army and its army would be fed but at the expense of the population, as happened in Germany the guys with the guns and the authority of their uniforms took the food they "needed" and tough luck to those who didn't. Don't doubt that many would resort to cannibalism when you force an entire nation to extremes, the problem was not that Japan had a shortage of food, it had great internal food production, the problem was too many people, the Army just gets fed first.
Agriculture which can be set ablaze from the air...
The Emperor would have capitulated before letting large scale famine occur. He actually had sent a peace agreement to FDR before Iwo Jima had even taken place. It was rejected as it was not the victory sought by the Allies, but it showed how far the Emporer had weakened in his resolve. Placed between a rock and a hard place (surrender or watch Japan starve to death), he would have given in to the same demands agreed upon after the nuclear bombings.
Treblaine said:
Yes, so many Kamikaze planes were held in reserve, this is why the Allies did not want to have to deal with. What makes you think they would hold these Kamikaze planes in reserve with intent to use them only to capitulate when their appointed time comes to attack the invading army?
The US estimated that Japan only had about 2500 Kamikaze aircraft. They knew they would hold these aircraft in reserve only to be used in the event of an Allied invasion. Allied air superiority (Big Blue Blanket) would make any attack on the US naval blockade a futile waste of precious resources. It is dubious that these planes could even reach the naval blockade given the fuel shortages. The Kamikazes would have only been useful when attacking an invasion fleet, in numbers, within close proximity to the mainland. If no invasion fleet is launched, due to the Japanese leadership capitulating, these planes would not have been used.
Treblaine said:
I did say ALL allied POWs which included British and other Allied nations' forces.
Approximately 80'600 Allied prisoners were released by Japan when it surrendered but the Allies excepted far more to be released as.
And these people were not dying in sudden explosions, they suffered long tortuous demise in horrific cruelty. They weren't soldiers any more, they weren't armed men fighting, they were prisoners, utterly helpless.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bataan/peopleevents/e_atrocities.html
And it was not just Allied prisoners who were suffering but also the people of the occupied territories where atrocities were ongoing and severe.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_war_crimes
Suffering is not death. The US knew that dropping the atomic bomb would result in the deaths of thousands of civilians, it was an absolute. They did not know whether waiting would have resulted in the deaths of the POWs held by the Japanese. Nuclear bombardment of Japanese civilians was just as likely to insight large scale retaliatory executions of Allied POWs as it was to intimidate them into surrender, clearly Allied command was willing to sacrifice these men. The remaining occupied territories were rapidly being taken by the Soviets. The number of immediate civilian deaths nearly tripled the number of POWs potentially in danger, the US must have had resonable estimates as to what these numbers would have been.
Treblaine said:
You WOULD think impending famine would be a huge motivating factor for the Japanese to surrender, but in August 1945 the Japanese gave no explicit intention to surrender, the military were in control weren't going to give up even if The Emperor wanted peace the army did not want to give a bit of ground.
If forced to choose between the Emporer or the militarists in the central government, the army would have always remained loyal to the Emporer, as was seen in the Kyujo Incident. Famine and supply shortages would only have served to weaken the position of the hardliners, while emboldening the Emporer in seeking peace. Conflict would have inevitably arisen between these two factions and the army would have reacted in favour of peace-seekers lead by the Emporer.
Treblaine said:
Japan wasn't going to return to modern civilisation, it had essentially emerged straight from medieval feudalism to modern society. It had modern technology like repeating rifles, planes and steel ships and high explosives but they were still in a Medieval mindset. The case with Nazi Germany and other fascist states was that it wanted to return to the brutal age of the Teutonic Knights, Japan hadn't really ever left that by 1930's, it still clung to a warrior ideology and unlike Europe and America that had in 18th and 19th century developed ideas such as humanitarian surrender and restraint on prisoners, Japan had given only token gestures signing the Geneva conventions to be included when it suited them but drop it as soon as it didn't suit them.
Japan had been known to show a great deal of respect and restriant to their prisoners before the 1920s. It was the militarist coups that occured in the 20s and 30s that resulted in the cruel barbaric regime of WW2.
Treblaine said:
A Soviet invasion of Hokkaido was highly speculative. You think the Western Allies who had such extensive naval forces in the region and had been planning for years and Invasion of Japan who were so cautious, you think the Soviets could just roll up and secure a beachhead in a few months? D-Day which was a MUCH SIMPLER operation than X-Day (invasion of Japan) took years of preparation and planning. The soviets had few ships, little experience in Naval warfare especially against planes and ESPECIALLY against Kamikaze bombers. Who says they could even make it to Hokkido? Who says they could supply them? They were to be without their principal advantages they had in the fighting they had just endured of massed tank and artillery and close air-support. They didn't have any aircraft carriers, they had short range fighters that would have struggled to make the 400km round trip and fight effectively.
Both the Western historians Frank and Glantz disagree, stating that the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido was highly probable had the war continued into the fall. They would not have needed an invasion akin to D-Day of X-Day, only a raiding force capable of taking an holding lightly defended terriotry, similar in scale to the Dieppe Raid. The Soviets has plenty experience and resources in the area to carry out such an operation. They had successfully carried out three amphibious landings in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands throughout 1945 alone. They would have met no resistance from the Japanese Navy or Airforce as the remnants of these forces were deployed in the South in preparation for an Allied invasion. There simply wasn`t any Kamikazes in the area, most hidden in Kyushu and Tokyo with only enough fuel to reach a southern invasion force. The 4-5 army divisions positioned in the North were second-rate, severely lacking in ammunition and thinly spread over a highly mountainous piece of geography. The Kuril Islands would have provided an ideal staging area, closer to the mainland than even Okinawa. Soviet Naval Infantry had been highly successful throughout the war, frequently operating with little supporting forces. Many veteran amphibious commando units were deployed throughout east-asia at the time, these same units participated in landings throughout Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin and the Kurils.
Treblaine said:
Look, Soviets had bigger fish to fry than the pipe dream of Hokkido, they were occupied with pretty much all of the vast country of China, in a de-facto-war with Chiang Kai-shek in support of communism. The Soviets took Sakhalin and that didn't get them any control of Japan. They were able to take Sakhalin as they already had a foothold on north Sakhalin, but an amphibious invasion these experts fighters would be amateurs. They had no way of getting the vast number of tanks across that they needed.
The Soviets swept through China in a matter of weeks, routing the Japanese across the entire region while rapidly capturing territory, the China fish had already been fried. Their ambitions in East Asia had changed.
The Soviet invasion force left many pockets of Japanese resistance behind in China instead marching all the way to Yalu River. Why bother marching to your logistical limits when your allies simply wanted a declaration of war and some troops sent into the theatre...Stalin wanted some lasting influence and potential allies in the east.
While their occupation in China certainly aided Mao and his supporters, the Soviets were never in any sort of war with Chiang Kai-shek.
Treblaine said:
Spurious. There was no need to rush American troops to the 38th Parallel, the Soviets stayed on their side. Yes the Americans rushed to South Korea as it was their responsibility to manage Korea south of 38th Parallel.
The Soviet invasion was stopped just north of the Yalu River, the beginning of the Korean peninsula, when even the aerial supply lines became unavailable. The amphibious forces already in Korea were able to establish some influence in the peninsula's north, but the ambition to take the entire peninsula was ended when American forces landed at Incheon on September 8, only six days after the signing of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender...What was the rush if they had no concerns with their Soviet ally...The Western Allies were already present in Germany, complying with Potsdam was the only logical option for Stalin. Korea was a pennisula containing no Western forces. It would have been easy to justify an invasion of the South Korea based on need to engage Japanese forces in the area.
If the US was unable to occupy the South before the Soviets, who would have fostered the formation a Nationalist government while surpressing pro-communist sympathies...
Once it was ensured that a Communist government was to take power in Korea, the Soviets could comply with Potsdam and move north of the 38th.
Treblaine said:
No, They used The Bomb out of fear of Japanese Imperialism, not fear of their soviet ally.
Japanese Imperialism was dead by August 1945, everyone knew it was only a matter of time. Fear of communism had been influencing Western policy since 1917, that is why the US, UK and France sent men to help crush the Bolseviks during the Russian Civil War. That was why Churchill had been pushing for Soviet invasion contingencies before Germany had even surrendered.