Ragdrazi said:
First of all, sorry for taking so long to get back to you. I've been under the weather.
My computer's been out of commission for awhile anyway. Power supply went kaput, and I chose the cheap shipping speed when I ordered a new one.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
Ragdrazi said:
Actually, the National Archives in Washington contain documents reporting our rejection of Japanese peace attempts going back to 1943.
That's very unlikely, since Japan did not make any peace attempts until after both A-bombs.
Your argument here "I'm right, because you're not right" is not inspiring, but seems quite indicative of everything you've been putting forward.
Up until August 10, the war faction was blocking any peace offer because they wanted to first slaughter Americans on Japan's beaches. (And even then, their idea of "peace" didn't involve surrendering.)
It was only when Hirohito ordered them that the military faction allowed any peace offers to be sent to us, and Hirohito didn't take such an action until after both A-bombs.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
Do you have any sort of reputable cite for that?
Yes! Unfortunately it's a footnote in the book I'm quoting from to a newspaper article from the mid-nineties. They don't have articles I can link to. The Internet didn't exist back then. I'm trying to find anything I can on that, unfortunately all I'm getting are other articles talking about it.
I hope it isn't an Alperovitz book. He has a tendency to selectively quote things in a way that leads people who don't know better to jump to erroneous conclusions.
I might be able to track whatever it is down if you told me what exactly you were looking for. I've probably heard every claim ever made on this issue, both correct and incorrect.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
Ragdrazi said:
Actually, in July, the Japanese government sent requests to Moscow, requesting Soviet help in establishing a peace. They hoped their ambassador would impress upon the Russians "the sincerity of our desire to end the war [and] have them understand that we are trying to end hostilities by asking for very reasonable terms in order to secure and maintain our national existence and honor." That's not a ceasefire. That's an end. We didn't have to wait for Russia to tell us this either. That quote is from an intercepted Japanese transmission to Russia.
Those Japanese transmissions did not indicate what exact terms they wanted, but they made it clear that the Japanese government wanted a lot more than just a guarantee for the Emperor.
No, they did not make it clear what terms they were looking for, but, again to quote the intercepted transmissions: "Since the situation is clearly recognized to be hopeless, large sections of the Japanese armed forces would not regard with disfavor an American request for capitulation even if the terms were hard."
The intercepted transmissions were entitled: "Japan seeking Soviet good offices to surrender"
The "large sections" there would be the Japanese Navy, which we had pretty much already sunk.
The Japanese Army, who were the ones we'd actually have to fight in an invasion, still had no interest in surrendering.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
And now that we have, in hindsight, records indicating the terms that Japan actually was trying to secure (Japanese army return home without surrendering or being disarmed, no occupation of Japan, no war crimes trials, etc) it is pretty clear that a ceasefire is exactly what Japan was aiming for.
I see, oralloy. You're willing to concede that we knew Japan was attempting to surrender.
No. First, we didn't know the exact terms until after the war.
Second, those terms are not a surrender. They are a ceasefire.
Ragdrazi said:
We knew at the time that they "would not regard with disfavor an American request for capitulation even if the terms were hard," but because we also know that their initial bargaining position would not have been complete capitulation, which is never the case in surrender, you're terming it a ceasefire. You say, that seems "pretty clear" to you. So, you're changing the rules of what I'm supposed to argue with you on?
Actually, we knew they would regard a request for capitulation with extreme disfavor, because we had made such a request, the Potsdam Proclamation, and Japan rejected it with a fair degree of scorn.
The ceasefire they wanted was not an "initial bargaining position" that they planned to move away from as negotiations progressed. That ceasefire was what the war faction actually intended to make us agree to after we had been demoralized from having hundreds of thousands of Americans die on Japan's beaches.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
Ragdrazi said:
Actually, according the official Survey I linked to, shortly before the bombs were dropped, there was a meeting between the Emperor and the leaders of the Japanese military. All the leaders pressed on him their desire to surrender. Now, that's the government's official position. Should I trust you, or the official position. Think I'm going to stick to the official position.
"All" the leaders did not press the Emperor to surrender at this meeting. Some of them advocated conditional surrender, and others advocated holding out so that millions of Japanese soldiers could repel our invasion in a massive bloody battle after which Japan would request a ceasefire.
Do you have a reputable cite for that? Because it's not in the Survey. Survey says half want surrender unconditionally, the other half wanted surrender with conditions. That is what is listed in the report. So if you've got a cite that contradicts it, by all means.
The side you are referring to as wanting "unconditional surrender" had a condition they were demanding: a guarantee that Hirohito would remain in power.
The side you are referring to as "surrender with conditions" are the guys who wanted Japan's military to just pack up and go home, with no war crimes trials or occupation of Japan. Those are indeed conditions. But that's not a surrender; it's a ceasefire.
For an online cite, there is this transcript (books are better than anything that is online though):
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pacific/filmmore/pt.html
"Foreign Minister Togo led the peace faction urging acceptance with one condition preserving the Emperor although stripped of his powers."
and
"Yet Anami and the militarists, still confident in Ketsu-Go, favored adding three additional conditions: there would be no occupation, the Japanese military would disarm itself and the military would try its own war criminals."
There are a number of books I can recommend:
For the best view of what Japan was doing, I recommend "Japan's Decision to Surrender" by Robert J.C. Butow. It is a comprehensive look at the position of the Japanese government in the last months of the war.
"Japan's Longest Day" by The Pacific War Research Society is another good look at what Japan's government was doing at the end of the war. It is focused mostly on the period after the A-bombs were dropped, which is after the period we are looking at. But it is still a good look at Japan's position at the time (and it is written by Japanese historians).
Another good book is "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" by Richard B Frank. The book is actually an attempt to argue that the A-bombs were the cause of Japan's surrender (a position I don't think they prove, but they provide a lot of good data in the process of trying to prove it). It provides a comprehensive overview of the MAGIC and ULTRA intercepts, and shows that those intercepts did not give much indication that Japan was interested in surrender. It also shows just how bad the invasion would have been had Japan not surrendered.
"Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat" by Paul Kecskemeti actually looks at four WWII surrenders (France surrendering to Germany, Italy surrendering to the Allies, Germany surrendering to the Allies, and Japan surrendering to the US). The part that focuses on Japan provides a decent analysis of the position of both the Japanese and US governments in the last months of the war.
"Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945" by Leon Sigal looks at the conflicting goals of various services and agencies within the US and Japanese governments as the war drew to an end.
"Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later" by Robert James Maddox is a thinly veiled rebuttal of everything written by Gar Alperovitz. It is essential for countering his misleading books.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
The notion that the USSBS is "the official version" is a little silly. It was an Air Force propaganda piece designed to promote the idea that conventional air power is all that is needed to win wars. The main goal was to maximize the Air Force's portion of the defense budget after the war when congress was dramatically ramping down defense spending.
If that's the case, then all the stranger that it would take the stance that it does. So, oralloy, are you able to challenge the research presented there in, or are you now attacking source materiel because you don't like what it has to say.
I think their conclusion that conventional bombing "would have" brought about surrender even without the A-bombs and the Soviets is a bit thin.
It certainly is plausible that it could have happened, but it is by no means definite that things would have turned out that way.
By and large though, I don't fault the report too much, so long as it is remembered that the report is based on things we only knew in hindsight.
I just think it is a little silly to place the report on a pedestal as if it were some grand unimpeachable source of information.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
And the plane that was trying to drop the second A-bomb on Kokura Arsenal was chased off by Japanese fighter planes.
Cite please. I've seen nothing that says that we had not obliterated Japan's air force by this point. If any planes managed to survive, I'd like to know about it.
"Two more passes over the target still produced no sightings of the aiming point. As an aircraft crewman, Jacob Beser, later recalled, Japanese fighters and bursts of antiaircraft fire were by this time starting to make things "a little hairy." Kokura no longer appeared to be an option, and there was only enough fuel on board to return to the secondary airfield on Okinawa, making one hurried pass as they went over their secondary target, the city of Nagasaki."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ops/nagasaki.htm
"Sweeney and his crew were under orders to only bomb visually. When they got to Kokura they found the haze and smoke obscuring the city as well as the large ammunition arsenal that was the reason for targeting the city. They made three unsuccessful passes, wasting more fuel, while anti-aircraft fire zeroed in on them and Japanese fighter planes began to climb toward them. The B-29s broke off and headed for Nagasaki. The phrase Kokura's Luck was coined in Japan to describe escaping a terrible occurrence without being aware of the danger."
http://www.hiroshima-remembered.com/history/nagasaki/page3.html
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
And besides that, there were thousands of kamikaze planes in position to sink US troop transports when we invaded.
Kamikaze!? There weren't kamikaze planes nor pilots left by that point!
Japan had thousands of kamikaze planes ready to attack troop transport ships as our invasion approached shore.
Ragdrazi said:
And besides we knew they were surrendering. You want to arbitrarily call it a ceasefire, that's fine. The fact that they were clawing and scratching to try to get to peace table is a fact you can't ignore.
That ceasefire offer wasn't even close to a proper surrender. And the faction that was pressing for a ceasefire wanted to wait and negotiate after the invasion had killed hundreds of thousands of Americans, so that we would be demoralized enough to agree to end the war with a ceasefire.
Ragdrazi said:
oralloy said:
We didn't have any such knowledge "at the time".
And you can't ignore the fact that while the USSBS was supported by hindsight evidence it was largely a culmination of facts we knew at the time.
No, the USSBS had a lot of evidence as to Japan's intent that the US government had no access to during the war.
Ragdrazi said:
One last quote from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson: "No effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb."
That's an odd statement.
The reason we were trying to achieve surrender is because we were trying to conquer Japan.
It is rather a given that our reason for seeking surrender wasn't "to avoid using the bombs".